Transaction Prices and Managed Care Discounting for Selected Medical Technologies: A Bargaining Approach by Avi Dor et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
TRANSACTION PRICES AND MANAGED CARE DISCOUNTING










Support for this project was provided to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) by
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, under grant no. HS10282-01 “Medical
Outcomes and the Pricing of Hospital Procedures.”  The authors are grateful to John Bridges,
Alison Evans Cueller, William Encinosa, and Robert Town for useful comments.  The views
expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
©2004 by Avi Dor, Michael Grossman and Siran M. Koroukian.  All rights reserved. Short
sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission
provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Transaction Prices and Managed Care Discounting for Selected Medical 
Technologies: A Bargaining Approach
Avi Dor, Michael Grossman and Siran M. Koroukian




It is generally assumed that managed care has been successful at capturing discounts from medical
providers, but the implications have been a matter of debate. Critics argue that managed care
organizations attain savings by reducing intensity of services, while others have argued that savings
are ‘real’ and are a consequence of discounts per unit of care. To address this, we obtain separate
transaction prices for hospital episodes (treatment) and for the narrowly defined surgical procedure,
using the example of heart bypass surgery. Both sets of prices were drawn from a database of
insurance claims of self-insured firms that offer a menu of insurance options. We use a Nash-
Bargaining framework to obtain price discounts by type of insurance.  Adjusting for product and
patient heterogeneity, the per-procedure prices yield the anticipated pattern of discounts: Relative
to traditional fee for service, point-of-service HMOs exhibited the largest discounts followed by
Preferred-Provider-Organizations (18 and 12 percent, respectively). While reductions in intensity
of services are not directly observable from the data, combining the results from the per-procedure
and per-episode analysis yields a range of intensity reduction of 20-6 percent, with a corresponding
per-unit price discount of 4-18 percent for the entire episode. We conclude that a large share cost
savings by managed care organizations are due to per-unit price reductions.
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It is generally assumed that managed care has been successful at capturing discounts from 
medical providers, but the implications have been a matter of debate. Critics argue that managed 
care organizations attain savings by reducing intensity of services, while others have argued that 
savings are ‘real’ and are a consequence of discounts per unit of care rather than reduced 
intensity. Because medical services tend to be bundled together into episodes of care, separating 
out prices and quantities can be difficult. Given available data, past studies focused on an 
“average” price for the aggregate hospital, calculated from total revenue divided by the number 
of inpatient days or cases (e.g., Melnick et al., 1992; Keeler and Melnick, 1999). Dranove and 
Ludwick, (1999) caution that these methods provide approximations of actual prices, and are 
subject to measurement error due to unobservable service mix differences. Examining treatment 
episodes for acute myocardial infarctions (heart attacks), Cutler, McClellan and Newhouse 
(2000) infer that discounts are attained by managed care plans are only partly due to reductions 
in intensity. Here, we employ data that enables us to observe transaction prices, i.e., actual 
payments borne by the payer and received by the hospital for major procedures on an 
“unbundled” basis. Our analysis differs from theirs in several important dimensions. Among 
these is the focus on pricing differences between various insurers and employers rather than 
differences within a single large insurer; as a consequence, we derive an empirical specification 
based on the bargaining framework due to Brooks, Dor and Wong (1997), rather than their 
insurer-based model. Moreover, to identify pure unit discounts we focus on the narrowly defined 
procedure.  Like Cutler et al., we focus on coronary heart disease, a leading cause of death. We 
examine a major procedure used to treat this disease, one that is costly and relatively common. In 
bypass surgery (more fully, coronary arterial bypass graft, or CABG) healthy segments of artery 
  
  
1are surgically inserted around the diseased arteries. In 2002 about 344,000 CABGs were 
performed in the U.S., with expenditures exceeding $21 billion. Other economists have focused 
on these procedures to examine market phenomena such as the hospital’s entry decision 
(Chernew et al., 2002) or information diffusion (Dranove et al., 2003), yet the pricing decision 
was not treated fully.  
 
II.  Bargaining Model for Pricing 
Hospitals have been willing to grant procedure-specific discounts to various insurers in 
return for guaranteed referrals (Anders, 1996, Hilzenrath, 1994). Price negotiations are 
conveniently captured in the Nash-bargaining process, in which two players are shown to 
maximize a joint objective function defined simply as the product of their net benefit functions. 
The resulting outcome is defined by a set of special properties, including symmetry of the two 
players. Dor and Watson (1995) use this framework to draw welfare implications in hypothetical 
hospital-physician bargaining over joint payments. Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1984) 
and Svejnar (1985) proposed a generalized Nash-bargaining model of the form Ω = U
τ(Z) ·V
1-τ(Z) , 
where τ denotes relative bargaining power, and U and V are the respective payoff functions of 
the two players, which the players maximize jointly. This model is particularly adaptable to 
analyses of actual market phenomenon such as wage or price negotiations since it relaxes the 
symmetry assumption of the original model, and allows for an empirical representation of 
relative bargaining power.  
For “per-procedure” prices, Brooks, Dor and Wong (1997) have shown that under the 
assumption of profit maximization and constant economies of the scale the payoff function of the 
hospital reduces to U = N(P-Pl), while the payoff function net gain to the self-insured firm from 
  
  
2bargaining is given as V = N(Pm- P), where N = number of insured all of whom are assumed to 
require medical care, and  Pl  and Pm are the disagreement prices of each of the players:  Pl  is the 
lowest price the hospital is willing to accept and Pm  is the maximum price the insurer is willing 
to pay.  Substituting into Ω and solving for P yields the solution 
P – Pl = τ · (Pm –Pl) 
Further parameterization of τ can be summarized as τ = τ (Z: H, I, F), where H is vector of 
hospital characteristics and its market, I denotes the type of insurance plan and market structure 
for the insurer-firm, and F reflects patient heterogeneity. The latter is required since the medical 
procedures are complex and cannot be delivered in a uniform fashion. Substituting into the above 
and slightly rearranging yields the estimating equation  
P – Pl = β · (Pm –Pl) +  Z’ γ ·(Pm –Pl) + D’φ + ε 
where D is a vector of state fixed-effects, ε is the disturbance term and β , γ, and φ are equivalent 
to coefficients obtained from a restricted least-squares regression. With additional restrictive 
assumptions precisely the same price equation can be written when bargaining occurs over 
payment per-episode of inpatient care (per hospitalization, or per ‘treatment’ a Cutler et al. refer 
to it) rather than over the more narrowly defined procedure price
1.  Thus, both regressions shown 
in Table 2 are specified using the same functional form.   
                                                 
1 Using E to denote per-episode payment, we can describe the hospital’s payoff as U = E - Em, 
where, and EI  = the hospital’s disagreement outcome, i.e., the minimum revenue that the 
hospital would be willing to accept to treat such a patient. Let the self-insured firm’s payoff 
function is V = Em  - E, where Em is the maximum expenditure the firm would incur to pay for an 
episode of hospitalization for a privately insured patient the relevant market. Players must jointly 
select E which maximizes Ω, noting that E is found on the interval Em < E < Em. With the 




III.  Data and Definitions of Transaction Prices for Hospitals 
  To obtain transaction prices we turn to the 1995-1996 MarketScan ‘service-level’ files 
that assemble insurance claims from about 80 large U.S. employers that self-insure. We extracted 
claims data for hospital admissions for which bypass surgery was the only invasive procedure 
performed (see Table 1).  We obtained prices under two definitions – for the narrowly defined 
procedure (procedure-price) and for the complete hospital case (treatment price), which includes 
services performed in conjunction with the main procedure, such as diagnostic tests, laboratory, 
and post-operation recovery.  For a small subset of cases, price negotiations may have centered 
on ‘treatment’. The data also allow us to control for heterogeneity of patients and procedures. 
Sample sizes and mean prices are summarized in Table 1. Values for both types of prices are 
comparable to values reported in the industry sources.  In Brooks et al., disagreement prices were 
obtained from an external database, which was available for  the analysis herein.  Therefore 
Disagreement prices were defined as the lowest price and highest price in the MSA conditional 
on a given severity for observations from the MSA with >80 observations. Over two-thirds of the 
sample came from such MSAs. For observations from smaller MSAs disagreement prices were 
based on the minimum or maximum for the entire state. To assure sufficient sample sizes, only 
the ten largest states were included.
2   
 
IV.  Data and Definitions of Managed Care 
                                                                                                                                                             
can rewrite Ω as:  E – El = τ(Em –E). Optimizing with respect to E yields the analogous 
specification as for the per-procedure equation in the text.   
 
2 California was excluded from the source data. 
  
  
4  About 60% of all insured individuals in the U.S. receive coverage through employer-
sponsored plans. The rate of self-insurance among employers is surprisingly high: in 1997, 55% 
of all insured employees who received employer-sponsored health insurance were enrolled in 
self-insured plans. In large firms of 500 or more employees the proportion of insured employees 
in self-insured plans was even higher, at 63% (Marquis and Long, 1999). Most self-insured firms 
tend to offer only one basic plan to their employees. Under a typical self-insured plan, the firm 
provides at-risk coverage to its employees and assumes responsibility for reimbursing providers 
directly. A private insurer may be contracted for the limited purpose of processing claims, 
receiving compensation for administrative expenses only.  
Rapid increases in HMO premiums coupled with concerns over bureaucratic controls 
have led large employers to shun traditional HMOs in favor of newer forms of managed care that 
allow employees greater flexibility and choice of providers (Freudenheim, 2000). This is 
reflected in the MarketScan data: although ‘closed-form’ HMOs were listed as an option, in 
practice no such cases occurred. About half of employees in the data enrolled in traditional fee-
for-services plan. A small number of individuals (about 5%) enrolled in fee-based Major Medical 
plans that provide limited coverage for serious illness and high-end medical services only. The 
dominant form for managed care is the preferred-provider-organization (PPO), a type of 
insurance plan whereby a selected network of providers is contracted to provide medical services 
at discounted fees, accounting for a third of all cases in the data.  This includes a rare number of 
cases (7), which belonged to exclusive-provider organizations (EPOs). EPOs operate similar 
networks, but unlike PPOs they do not provide consumers with the option of going outside the 
network of providers under a higher copayments. 
  
  
5 About 6% of individuals were enrolled in point-of-service HMOs (POS-HMO). POS-
HMOs resemble traditional HMOs as long as consumers stay within the network: cost-sharing by 
patients is minimal, but the ability to choose among providers is also minimal; in addition 
patients are assigned a ‘gatekeeper’, usually a family physician or nurse case manager, and are 
not able to access specialists directly without the gatekeeper’s referral. However, like PPOs, 
POS-HMOs give their members the option of choosing physicians and hospitals outside the 
network, in exchange for higher out-of-pocket participation. Hospitals may assume some of the 
insurance risk, but this varies across plans.  
  The distribution of cases by type of insurer can be gleaned from Table 1. For comparison, 
nationwide PPOs were the dominant form of private insurance in 1995 with a market share of 
49% compared with 22% for HMOs and only 26% for fee-for-service plans. POS-HMOs 
comprised about 3% of the national market, but their market share has grown to 7 percent in 
recent years. (HIAA, 2000).  
 
IV. Supplementary Data Sources  
MarketScan data were augmented with variables describing market structure as predictors 
of bargaining power. These included the Herfindahl index for hospitals with cardiac services and 
the HMO penetration rate calculated over metropolitan statistical areas
3, and the percent of 
employees in the county in large firms of 100 employees or more, all with a one-year lag. They 
were drawn from the American Hospital Association Annual Surveys, the Area Resource file and 
the County Business Practice Pattern file respectively. A supplemental MarketScan file 
                                                 
3 The authors are grateful to Douglas Wholey for providing a mapping of ARF counties to 
  MSAs. See Wholey et al., 1995.  
  
  
6contained additional variables on hospital teaching and for-profit status. The combined analysis 
files mapped to 472 hospitals. 
 
V.  Bargaining Results and Price Discounts 
  Table 2 reports regressions on procedure and treatment prices. Models are qualitatively 
similar, although hospital characteristics are significant only in the treatment model. The 
significant coefficients of the herfindahl index for hospitals performing heart surgery indicates 
that increased concentration in hospital markets leads to higher prices: an increase of this index 
from a ‘low’ level of concentration of 0.25 to a high concentration of 0.75 (mean=0.34) implies a 
12% increase procedure-price and a 15 increase in treatment-price. The results of greatest 
interest are the levels of price discounting associated with the various forms of insurance, as 
summarized in Table 3.  For comparison, results of three main functional forms are presented: 
semi-log, linear (OLS), and restricted OLS for the Nash-bargaining model. While all models 
yield qualitatively similar results, our main interest lies with the bargaining model where 
transaction-level costs are implicitly differenced out (Brooks et al. 1997).   The per-treatment and 
per-procedure cases yield the same expected pattern: HMOs exhibit the deepest discounts, 
followed by PPOs. Prices for major-medical plans are not significantly different from fee-for-
service and were therefore excluded from Table 3. However, HMO discounts are higher on a 
per-treatment basis than on a per-procedure basis (24% and 18% respectively). Since the data 
would not allow us to separate out prices and quantities for every additional service delivered in 
conjunction with the main surgical procedure, it is not possible to determine the share of the per-
treatment discounts attributable to reductions in service intensity. However, we are able to place 
bounds on the intensity factor by making the alternate assumption that the observed per-
  
  
7treatment discount applied either to the main procedure exclusively or to all other related 
services equally. If the observed per-treatment discount applied to the main procedure 
exclusively, then the average per unit discount would be 4% and the reduction in intensity would 
be 20%.  On the other hand if the price applied equally to all procedures, then point of service 
HMOs would reap a price cut of 18% and a service reduction of only 6%.
4 
 
VI.   Summary and Conclusion  
It is anecdotally known that managed care organizations attempt to lower their costs 
internally by providing lower payments to providers. Our analysis suggests that these payments 
represent discounts that persist even after adjusting for the underlying patient heterogeneity and 
the characteristics of the medical procedure in a given case, for managed care plans offered by 
employers. We further find that greater market concentration in hospitals tends to raise prices. 
Together these results are consistent with the predictions of the bargaining model.  Rather than 
focusing solely on the entire episode of care as in an earlier related study by Cutler et al., our 
                                                 
4 To illustrate it, suppose there are two procedures (1 and 2) associated with the full treatment. 
Let e be expenditures on the treatment.  Then e = p1q1 + p2q2, where p1 and p2 are prices and q1 
and q2 are quantities.  Let x represent the insurance variable (for convenience, we assume it is 
continuous; the use of dummy variables to estimate plan effects will not alter the following 
point). Differentiate e with respect to x to get 
 
). q ~ p ~ )( k 1 ( ) q ~ p ~ ( k e ~
2 2 1 1 + − + + =    
Here  





e ~ =  
 
We have data on e and p1. Based on the bargaining model results in Table 3 for HMOs,  24 e ~ =  
percent and  18 p ~
1 = percent.  We assume  . 0 q ~
1 =   Based on Table 1 for the fee-for-service group, 
k = 6704/28903 = .23.  If  , 0 p ~
2 = the price discount on the treatment is  = 1 p ~ k  .23*18 percent = 4 
percent.  But if q , 0 ~





8analysis focused on transaction prices for the narrowly defined medical procedure. Both studies 
conclude that a large share of cost savings by managed care organizations are due to per-unit 
price reductions. Our results are especially relevant to the current marketplace, as purchasers 
transition out of closed model HMOs into the types of flexible managed care plans that are 
observed in our data. However, the extent to which these discounts are passed on to consumers 
remains an open question. This limits our ability to comment on the welfare implications of these 
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Table 1:  Hospital Transaction Prices for Bypass Surgery: 
  Means  and  Distribution*
 








   Major Medical , µ  27987.4  9646.7 
       σ 11836.3  9441.9 
       N  190  168 
   Fee-for-service, µ  28903.4  6740.4 
       σ   10900.8           3901.4 
       N  1948  1802 
    PP0  27598.0  5390.4 
       σ 11489.2  3025.1 
       N             1208  1143 
   HMO (point-of-service), µ  26177.7  6239.4 
        σ   14716.4  4920.8 
        N  211  184 
  Low End Procedure
1, µ   28212.4  6137.5 
       σ 11223.9  3847.6 
       N  2366  2202 
 High End Procedure
1, µ  28233.9  6507.1 
       σ 11764.4  4464.6 
       N  1155  1062 
 
1.  Low-end procedure: single artery, with or without catheterization;  







12  Table 2: Regressions on Hospital Transaction Prices (P-Pl) 
 1,2  
 
 
(Variable) * (Pm-Pl) 
     Treatment      Procedure 
 
Patient-Product Characteristics  
    Trait 2  
    Trait 3 
    Trait 4 
    Trait 5 
    Urgent 
    No. Comorbidities  
 
 
    0.002  (0.007) 
    0.003  (0.007) 
    0.003 (0.008) 
    0.001  (0.001) 
   -0.003  (0.006) 




   0.003  (0.007) 
   0.003  (0.007) 
   0.004  (0.002)
b 
  -0.003  (0.005) 
  -0.003  (0.006) 
   0.004  (0.002)
 b  
Insurance Type 
    Fee-for-service (ref) 
    Major-Medical 
    PPO 
    HMO  
 
   ---- 
   -0.003   (0.028) 
   -0.035   (0.007)
a 
   -0.092   (0.013)
 a  
 
   ---- 
   0.014   (0.028) 
  -0.042  (0.007)
 a  
  -0.063  (0.009)
 a  
 
Hospital Characteristics 
    Minor Teaching  
    Major Teaching 
    For-Profit 
 
Market Structure 
     Cardiac Herfindahl Index 
     HMO penetration  
     % employees in large firms 
 




    0.023  (0.007)
a  
    0.051  (0.008)
a  




   0.057  (0.018)
b  
  -0.056  (0.004) 
  -0.126  (0.183) 
 
   0.157   (0.031)
 a  
 
 
  -0.007  (0.008) 
   0.011  (0.019) 
   0.011  (0.024) 
 
 
   0.042  (0.021)
b  
  -0.014  (0.044) 
  -0.101  (0.242) 
 
   0.558   (0.040)




              
      Year (1996) 
        




  -1457.5  (412.52)
 a  
     




 254.412  (84.52)
 a  
     
           yes) 
 
      R
2 
  
        0.853 
  
         0.848 
 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors are used to correct for heteroscedasticity due to hospital 
clusters; b: 0.01< p < 0.05,  a: p < 0.01     
 
Trait 1 – 5: single arterial bypass; double bypass; triple bypass; quadruple+ bypasses; with 






Table 3:  Managed Care Discounts, Relative to Fee-For-Service 
  
 Per  Treatment
+, ++ 
  Bargaining     Linear            Semi-log  
      
PPOs              9.28%      6.11%      9.13% 
      
HMOs       24.40%     23.02%    27.91% 











  Per  Procedure 
  Bargaining    Linear           Semi-log  
      
PPOs           12.25%   13.09%   13.01% 
      
HMOs      18.33%    21.16%   23.11% 













+ Includes surgery, room and board, lab, anesthesiology, radiology, ancillary services,  
  post op, other). : 
+ +  All results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
 